

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00630 01 OF 05 191027Z

11

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

NRC-05 /094 W

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R 181415Z DEC 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1359

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0630

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DEC 18 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0623 - DTG 161315Z DEC 75

BEGIN SUMMARY

1. THE FINAL PLENARY MEETING OF THE SEVENTH ROUND OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE NINETIETH SUCH MEETING SINCE THE VIENNA TALKS BEGAN, TOOK PLACE DECEMBER 18, WITH SOVIET REP KHLESTOV DELIVERING THE ONLY STATEMENT. KHLESTOV'S PRESENTATION CONTAINED THE FIRST OFFICIAL EASTERN REACTION IN VIENNA TO THE NEW WESTERN NUCLEAR  
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00630 01 OF 05 191027Z

PROPOSAL (SEE PARAS 29-33 BELOW) INTRODUCED IN PLENARY DECEMBER 16

(SEE REFTTEL), WHICH SOVIET REP SAID THE EAST WOULD NOW STUDY.

2. COMMENTING ON THE ALLIES OFFER, SOVIET REP POINTED OUT THAT WHEREAS THE EAST HAD PROPOSED SINCE THE TABLING OF ITS DRAFT AGREEMENT A ROUGHLY 15 PERCENT REDUCTION BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL INCLUDED REDUCTIONS OF ONLY SOME US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEN ONLY IF THE EAST WOULD AGREE TO THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROGRAM. KHLESTOV SAID THE WEST HAD EMPHASIZED THE ONE-TIME CHARACTER OF ITS OFFER. HE OBSERVED THAT THE PROPOSAL WOULD NOT HINDER THE FURTHER BUILD-UP OF NON US WESTERN AIR FORCES, AS WELL AS DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOVIET REP ALSO REFERRED TO THE PRESS PUBLICITY WHICH PRECEDED THE TABLING OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL AND ASKED HOW THE EAST SHOULD EVALUATE THIS PROPAGANDA IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS (I.E., THE CONFIDENTIALITY RULE).

3. THE BALANCE OF KHLESTOV'S STATEMENT CONSISTED OF A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE DEFINITIONS DISCUSSION, AND A GENERAL CRITICISM ALONG STANDARD LINES OF WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE FULL TEXT OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT FOLLOWS. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR CHAIRMAN,

1. ANOTHER ROUND OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, THE AIM OF WHICH IS TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST MULTILATERAL REDUCTION IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPE OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE CENTRE OF THE CONTINENT, IS OVER.

2. THE SOVIET UNION ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE CPSU, L I BREZHNEV, STATED ON 9 DECEMBER 1975 IN WARSAW THAT NOW QUESTIONS OF MILITARY DETENTE HAVE 'A PARTICULARLY TOPICAL NATURE'.  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00630 01 OF 05 191027Z

HE STRESSED IN THIS CONNECTION 'PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, FOR WHICH WE ARE SINCERELY STRIVING, WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THIS FIELD.'

3. NOW, AFTER THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE, THE ATTENTION PAID TO OUR NEGOTIATIONS BY A WIDE CIRCLE OF STATES AND OF PUBLIC OPINION AND INTEREST IN THEIR SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME

ARE GROWING. AND THIS IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE, IN THAT THE RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS SHOULD BE DECISIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHICH WOULD COMPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE IN THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE WITH SPECIFIC MEASURES OF MILITARY DETENTE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL COUNTRIES AND OF ALL PEOPLES.

4. THE DETAILED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS, AS BEFORE, HAS PROCEEDED IN A SERIOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE, AND HAS PERMITTED PARTICIPANTS TO DEEPEN THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF ONE ANOTHER'S POSITION. THIS CONCERNS IN PARTICULAR THE QUESTION, WHICH IS OF PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE, OF AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITION OF WHICH FORCES SHOULD FOR THE PURPOSES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS BELONG TO GROUND FORCES, AND WHICH TO AIR FORCES.

5. AT THE SAME TIME IT HAS TO BE SAID THAT IT HAS NONETHELESS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN ANY PERCEPTIBLE SHIFTS IN THE DIRECTION OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SUCH A SITUATION, AFTER MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, CANNOT BUT GIVE RISE TO FEELINGS OF DISSATISFACTION.

6. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE GIVEN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE REASONS FOR THESE DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARE OBSTRUCTING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HAVE SAID HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME THEM AND, AT LAST, TO SET ABOUT AGREEING ON PRACTICAL STEPS FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00630 02 OF 05 181554Z

42

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0630

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

7. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ADVANCED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS A COMPREHENSIVE AND CLEAR PROGRAMME OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, WHICH IS A REALISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT BOTH ON A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION AND ON FIRST STEPS IN THIS FIELD. ITS IMPLEMENTATION WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE PRESENT HIGH CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS IN THIS REGION AND WOULD IN A REAL WAY STRENGTHEN BOTH OVERALL SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE SECURITY OF EACH STATE, WITHOUT GIVING IN THE PROCESS UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO ANYBODY.

8. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE GDR, POLAND, USSR AND CSSR OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973, AND ALSO THE SERIES OF ADDITIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00630 02 OF 05 181554Z

INITIATIVES, WHICH TAKE ACCOUNT OF SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, CREATE A GOOD BASIS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE TASK FACING US, BASED ON A SOBER ASSESSMENT OF THE REALITIES EXISTING IN THE CENTRE OF THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE AND FULL CORRESPONDING TO THE PRINCIPLES AND SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AGREED AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS.

9. I SHOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST ROUND HAVE CONFIRMED THE JUSTIFIED CHARACTER OF THE PROGRAMME OF REDUCTIONS ADVANCED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

10. SOON THE DELEGATIONS REPRESENTED AT THIS TABLE WILL DISPERSE TO THEIR CAPITALS IN ORDER TO EXAMINE THE RESULTS OF THE WORK THAT HAS BEEN DONE AND TO THINK OVER THE PROSPECTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HOPE THAT THE FORTHCOMING BREAK WILL BE USED BY OUR PARTNERS IN ORDER TO ANALYZE THE SITUATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM ALL ASPECTS AND TO TAKE UP A MORE REALISTIC POSITION WHICH WOULD PERMIT US TO SET ABOUT THE MUTUAL REDUCTION

OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THIS CONNECTION WE SHOULD LIKE ONCE AGAIN TO POINT OUT WHICH ELEMENTS OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IN THE VIEW OF THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, ARE HINDERING THE ATTAINMENT OF SPECIFIC RESULTS IN VIENNA.

11. WE SHOULD LIKE TO STATE QUITE DEFINITELY THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO COUNT ON THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IF ONE PART OF THEIR PARTICIPANTS TRIES TO GET THEIR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS TO ACCEPT UNEQUAL CONDITIONS. BY PERSISTENTLY ADVOCATING "ASYMMETRICAL" REDUCTION, UNDER WHICH IN EXCHANGE FOR AN INSIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES THE FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST STATES WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE DIRECTLY CONTRADICTING THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES. TO DEFEND SUCH A PROPOSAL MEANS CONSCIOUSLY TO PLAN TO RECEIVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT THE COST OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

12. IN TRYING TO JUSTIFY SUCH A POSITION, THE REPRESENTATIVES  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00630 02 OF 05 181554Z

OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO EMPLOY THE INVENTED CONCEPT OF "DISPARITIES" IN THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND OF THE WARSAW PACT, DECLARING THAT THEIR APPROACH IS BASED ON "THE FACTS OF THE EXISTING MILITARY FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE." AS HAS BEEN SHOWN YET AGAIN IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST ROUND BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, THIS ASSERTION DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO REALITY.

13. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TAKE FOR THEIR ASSESSMENTS IN FACT ONLY GROUND FORCES, DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE FACT THAT THERE ARE LOCATED IN THE CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT ALSO AIR FORCES AND VARIOUS TYPES OF MODERN ARMAMENT AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION THE POSITION ADOPTED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IN WORKING OUT A DEFINITION OF WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS BELONG TO GROUND FORCES AND WHAT TO AIR FORCES BEARS WITNESS TO THEIR EFFORT TO WORK OUT A DEFINITION WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THEIR ONE-SIDED AND GROUNDLESS APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00630 03 OF 05 181559Z

12

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0630

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

14. HOW IS IT THAT THE WESTERN STATES ARE TRYING TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM? SINCE THE NATO COUNTRIES INTEND TO CONFINE REDUCTIONS TO GROUND FORCES, THEY ARE MANAGING MATTERS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AGREE TO THE DEFINITION ONLY OF THIS TYPE OF ARMED FORCES. MOREOVER THEY ARE TRYING TO FORMULATE THIS DEFINITION ITSELF IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CONFIRM THE CONCEPT, ARTIFICIALLY CREATED BY THEM, OF "DISPARITIES".

IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES STUBBORNLY REFUSE TO AGREE TO A CLEAR AND INDISPUTABLE PRINCIPLE UNDER WHICH IDENTICAL FORCES, OR FORCES OF THE SAME TYPE, MUST BELONG TO ONE AND THE SAME TYPE OF ARMED FORCES.

15. AT THE SAME TIME THE QUESTION OF DEFINITIONS HAS SERIOUS PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE FOR WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00630 03 OF 05 181559Z

OF ARMED FORCES GO TO MAKE UP ONE OR ANOTHER TYPE OF ARMED FORCES FOR THE PURPOSES OF REDUCTIONS AND WHAT ORGANIZATIONS, BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT CAN BE NOT INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS. TO WORK OUT AN AGREED DEFINITION IS ESSENTIAL, IF ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES SITUATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS NOT INDENTICAL. THE ATTAINMENT OF UNDERSTANDING ON THIS QUESTION WILL PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN AGREEING TO THE SPECIFIC DIMENSIONS OF REDUCTIONS.

16. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PRECEDE FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE REAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION SHOULD BE ASSESSED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL ITS COMPONENTS. THE DISTORTION OF THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS FOUND ITS REFLECTION IN THE CONCEPT OF "DISPARITIES" AND IN UNFOUNDED ARGUMENTS OF THE INSTABILITY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WAS REQUIRED BY THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES EXCLUSIVELY TO JUSTIFY THEIR ONE-SIDED POSITION. BUT ONE CANNOT TREAT REAL FACTS IN SUCH A WAY. IT IS MOREOVER WELL KNOWN TO OUR WESTERN PARTNERS - AND WE HAVE REPEATEDLY MENTIONED THIS - THAT IN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES THE EXISTING FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAS BEEN CHARACTERISED AS INSURING EQUILIBIUM AND STABILITY. THAT IS WHY A WHOLE SERIES OF IMPORTANT LEADING FIGURES IN THE WESTERN STATES HAVE ADVOCATED THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS FORCE RELATIONSHIP.

17. NO ONE CAN DOUBT THAT IT IS THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAT HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO BEGIN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IF IT IS CHANGED, AS IS ENVISAGED IN THE WESTERN PLAN, THIS WILL LEAD TO A REDUCTION IN STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THIS REGION. OUR AIM IS DIFFERENT-TO ENHANCE STABILITY HERE AND TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY, AND ONE CAN ONLY OBTAIN THIS BY MEANS OF THE EQUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES, AS PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

18. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE AIM OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THEIR FAVOUR AND TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY

INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALISTS STATES CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

19. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE THAT AFTER MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF  
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00630 03 OF 05 181559Z

NEGOTIATIONS WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES STILL DO NOT SEE THAT THE STUBBORN UNWILLINGNESS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA TO GIVE A CLEAR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS ON REDUCTIONS THEY ARE READY TO ASSUME IS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE FOR WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL REDUCTIONS. HOW CAN ONE SET ABOUT WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT, WHICH IS MEANT TO BE THE FINAL

RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS, IF THE WESTERN WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE COUNTRY, REFUSE TO SAY WHAT REDUCTION OF FORCES EACH OF THEM IS READY TO CARRY OUT ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY AND IN WHAT PERIOD OF TIME? IN THIS CONNECTION THEY PUT FORWARD DEMANDS RELATING TO THE DIMENSIONS OF THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND THEIR COMBAT EQUIPMENT. SUCH A POSITION IS UNJUSTIFIABLE BOTH FROM THE POLITICAL AND FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW.

20. ALL THE STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MAKE AN EQUIVALENT CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MILITARY DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHICH MAY BE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED BY MEANS OF AN AGREED REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS LOCATED

THERE. IF ANYONE THINKS THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WILL GO INTO A REDUCTION WHICH WOULD BE HARMFUL TO THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS, THEN HE IS DEEPLY MISTAKEN. THE TASK WHICH HAS BEEN PUT BEFORE THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE CARRIED OUT ONLY WITH THE HELP OF THEIR JOINT AGREED EFFORTS.

21. THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST ROUND HAVE SHOWN THAT TAKING COVER BEHIND THE CONCEPTION OF THE "EQUAL COLLECTIVE CEILINGS",

THE EUROPEAN WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TRYING TO SECURE FOR THEMSELVES IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT THE RIGHT TO INCREASE-EVEN BY COMPARISON WITH THEIR PRESENT LEVEL- THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THIS IS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION WITH THE AIMS OF THE REDUCTION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

22. LIKEWISE UNFOUNDED AND UNJUSTIFIED IS THE THESIS CONCERNING THE SO-CALLED "MORE BURDENSOME" CONSEQUENCES FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES OF A REDUCTION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN VIEW OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCE IN THE SITUATION OF THE USSR AND USA IN RELATION TO THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00630 03 OF 05 181559Z

AREA OF REDUCTIONS. IT IS EVIDENT FROM OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT THAT THE OBLIGATIONS FOR LIMITING ARMED FORCES AS A RESULT OF REDUCTION WILL BE, LIKE THE REDUCTIONS THEMSELVES, MUTUAL AND OF EQUAL VALUE FOR THE COUNTRIES LOCATED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION AND FOR THE COUNTRIES WHICH

GEOGRAPHICALLY DO NOT BELONG TO THIS AREA BUT WHOSE FORCES ARE LOCATED

THERE.

CONFIDENTIAL



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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00630 04 OF 05 181618Z

42

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA0630

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

23. IF ONE IS TO PROCEED BY EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE AGREED AREA, THEN IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE OF THE USSR AND USA FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTION BUT ALSO MANY OTHER FACTORS AS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESENCE OF FORCES OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES IN DIRECT PROXIMITY TO CENTRAL EUROPE, THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN MILITARY BASES AND PERSONNEL, COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENTS IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE MOBILISATION POTENTIAL OF STATES AND SO ON AND SO FORTH. WE ARE SURPRISED BY THE ONE-SIDED APPROACH OF THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES, WHO INSIST ONLY ON THOSE FACTORS WHICH THEY THINK HELP TO JUSTIFY THEIR POSITION AND COMPLETELY IGNORE OTHER IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCES ALTHOUGH WITHOUT THEM THE WHOLE PICTURE PRESENTS A DISTORTED IMAGE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00630 04 OF 05 181618Z

24. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EMPHASISE THAT ACCORDING TO THE DECISIONS ADOPTED AT THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS THE OBJECT OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IS THE WORKING OUT OF MEASURES FOR THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN A DEFINITE AREA, NAMELY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

25. THE REFERENCES OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO THE SO-CALLED "SPECIAL SITUATION" OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CAN IN NO WAY SERVE AS A BASIS FOR THE REFUSAL OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA TO TAKE UPON THEMSELVES FROM THE VERY BEGINNING CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES.

26. A SERIOUS DEFECT OF THE WESTERN PLAN IS THAT IT ENVISAGES REDUCTION ONLY OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES AND CERTAIN KINDS OF ARMAMENTS AND EXCLUDES FROM THE SCOPE OF THE REDUCTION THE OVERWHELMING PART OF THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT. MEANWHILE IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS CONCENTRATED A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE KINDS OF ARMAMENTS. THE INTERESTS OF GENUINE MILITARY DETENTE REQUIRE, THEREFORE, THAT THE REDUCTIONS SHALL INCLUDE GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES AND ALL KINDS OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONRY, WITH WHICH THEY ARE EQUIPPED.

27. WE CANNOT ACCEPT AS CONVINCING THE ARGUMENTS OF THE DELEGATIONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TO THE EFFECT THAT THEIR PLAN FOR REDUCTION DOES NOT DO HARM TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. OBVIOUSLY NO-ONE AT THIS TABLE WOULD VENTURE TO CONTEST THE TRUTH THAT EACH PARTICIPANT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DECIDES FOR HIMSELF WHAT COULD RELIABLY GUARANTEE THE REQUIREMENTS OF HIS SECURITY. THEREFORE WE THINK THAT A REDUCTION AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT ONLY IF IT CORRESPONDS TO THE PRINCIPLES OF NOT CAUSING DAMAGE TO THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE SIDES, MUTUALITY OF REDUCTION, NON-ACQUISITION OF ONE-SIDED MILITARY ADVANTAGES. IT IS IN THIS LIGHT THAT WE WANT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO STUDY OUR CRITICISMS OF THEIR REDUCTION APPROACH AND BRING THEIR POSITION INTO CONFORMITY WITH THESE PRINCIPLES.  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00630 04 OF 05 181618Z

28. IN CONNECTION WITH THE SPEECH ON THE 16 DECEMBER BY THE DISTINGUISHED HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE USA, AMBASSADOR RESOR, IN WHICH READINESS WAS EXPRESSED TO REDUCE, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN, A CERTAIN PART OF THE AMERICAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONRY LOCATED IN

CENTRAL EUROPE, THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO SAY THE FOLLOWING.

29. THE SOVIET UNION TOGETHER WITH OTHER SOCIALIST STATES FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAS CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATED THAT THE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH WE ARE NOW WORKING OUT SHOULD ENVISAGE THE REDUCTION OF ALL KINDS OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONRY. IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT INTRODUCED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE GDR, PPR, USSR AND CZSSR ON NOVEMBER 8, 1973 IT IS PROPOSED THAT ALL STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL IMPLEMENT WITHIN A DEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME REDUCTIONS OF THEIR FORCES, INCLUDING SUB-UNITS AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONRY BY APPROXIMATELY 15 PER CENT. AS IS KNOWN, THE MEANS OF DELIVERY OF SUCH WEAPONRY EXISTS AT THE PRESENT TIME IN THE ARMED FORCES OF ALL THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WHOSE FORCES ARE IN THE ARE OF REDUCTION, EXCEPT LUXEMBOURG AND CANADA.

30. IT IS INDICATED IN AMBASSADOR RESOR'S STATEMENT THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE READY TO INCLUDE IN REDUCTIONS A CERTAIN QUANTITY ONLY OF AMERICAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THAT ON THE CONDITION THAT THE SOCIALIST STATES ACCEPT THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS, OUR CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF WHICH IS WELL KNOWN.

31. ONE CANNOT FAIL TO SEE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE MEASURES PROPOSED WHICH HAVE, AS WAS EMPHASISED IN THE STATEMENT, A ONE-TIME CHARACTER, WILL IN FACT NOT PLACE ANY LIMITATIONS ON THE FURTHER INCREASE BOTH OF AIR FORCES AND OF THE MEANS OF DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

32. THE FOLLOWING FACT ALSO DRAWS ATTENTION TO ITSELF. THE VIEWS PRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR RESOR AT THE PLENARY SESSION ON CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00630 04 OF 05 181618Z

16 DECEMBER WERE LONG BEFORE SET OUT IN DETAIL IN THE WESTERN PRESS AND WIDELY PROPAGANDISED BY IT. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS THE QUESTION INEVITABLY ARISES OF HOW ONE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THIS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PRACTICE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR PROCEDURE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00630 05 OF 05 181614Z

42

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

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R 181415Z DEC 75

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0630

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

33. SUCH ARE OUR PRELIMINARY COMMENTS. THE VIEWS SET OUT IN  
AMBASSADOR RESOR'S STATEMENT WILL OF COURSE BE EXAMINED, AS IS OUR  
NORMAL PRACTISE.

34. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS THOUGHT IT NECESSARY ONCE MORE TO SET  
OUT ITS VIEWS IN A FRANK AND CLEAR FORM ON THE DEY ASPECTS OF THE  
PROBLEM DISCUSSED BY US, SINCE THEY HAVE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE  
FUTURE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

35. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED  
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH DOES NOT GIVE UNILATERAL  
MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO ANYBODY AND DOES NOT DISTURB THE RELATIONSHIP  
OF FORCES WHVICH HAS COME INTO BEING IN THIS AREA WOULD BE IN THE  
INTERESTS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ALSO OF  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00630 05 OF 05 181614Z

THE PARTICIPANTS WITH SPECIAL STATUS, JUST AS ALL OTHER EUROPEANS

STATES.

36. THAT IS WHY WE AGAIN REPEAT THAT IF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES REALLY  
WANT TO ACHIEVE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, THEY MUST SHOW  
REALISM, RENOUNCE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARYS  
AND GO OVER, FINALLY, TO A PRACTICAL SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS ON THAT  
BASIS  
ON WHICH AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS.  
END TEXT.RESOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, MEETING PROCEEDINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 18 DEC 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975MBFRV00630  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750441-0790  
**From:** MBFR VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19751228/aaaaayoi.tel  
**Line Count:** 664  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 13  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 MBFR VIENNA 623  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22 SEP 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <02 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; RELEASED <22 SEP 2003 by greeneet>; APPROVED <23 SEP 2003 by GarlanWA>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DEC 18 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT  
**TAGS:** PARM, US, UR, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006